Davy Jones's Locker
By William S. Lind [The views expressed in this article are
those of Mr. Lind, writing in his personal
capacity. They do not reflect the opinions
or policy positions of the Free Congress
Foundation, its officers, board or
employees, or those of Kettle Creek
Corporation.] Last week, for three days running, the
Washington Times carried front-page stories
about the interception of a U.S. Navy
aircraft carrier, the Kitty Hawk, by a
Chinese submarine. The submarine, a Song-
class diesel-electric boat, popped up
undetected in the middle of a carrier battle
group, which was operating in deep water off
Okinawa. Armed with Russian-made wake-homing
torpedos that can ruin a carrier's day, the
sub was well within range of the Kitty Hawk
when it surfaced. While the Washington Times headline read
"Admiral says sub risked a shootout," the
incident meant little in itself. Navies play
these kinds of "Gotcha!" games with each
other all the time; both U.S. and Soviet
subs were quite good at it during the Cold
War. Since neither the U.S. nor China are
seeking war, there was no danger of a naval
Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The paper quoted
an unidentified U.S. Navy official as
saying, correctly, "We were operating in
international waters, and they were
operating in international waters. From that
standpoint, nobody was endangering anybody.
Nobody felt threatened." There are, still, some lessons here. One is
that, contrary to the U.S. Navy's fervent
belief, the aircraft carrier is no longer
the capital ship. It ceded that role long
ago to the submarine. In one naval exercise
after another, the sub sinks the carriers.
The carriers just pretend it didn't happen
and carry on with the rest of the exercise. About thirty years ago, my first boss,
Senator Robert Taft Jr. of Ohio, asked
Admiral Hyman Rickover how long he thought
the U.S. aircraft carriers would last in the
war with the Soviet navy, which was largely
a submarine navy. Rickover's answer, on the
record in a hearing of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, was, "About two days."
The Committee, needless to say, went on to
approve buying more carriers. Another lesson is that diesel-electric subs
can be as effective or more effective than
nuclear boats in same situations. The U.S.
Navy hates the very idea of non-nuclear
submarines and therefore pretends they don't
count for much. You can buy four to eight
modern diesel-electric submarines for the
cost of a single American "U-cruiser" nuke
boat. At this point, the Chinese sub's successful
interception of our carrier does raise an
interesting question: How was that sub in
the right position to make an interception?
What a nuclear submarine can do but a diesel-
electric sub cannot is undertake along, high-
speed chases. Was it just dumb luck that the
Chinese sub was where we, in effect, ran
into it? Or were the Chinese able to
coordinate the sub's movement over time with
successful tracking of our carrier battle
group? If the latter is the case, the
Chinese Navy may be starting to become a
real navy instead of just a collection of
ships. That transformation is far more
important than whether China has this or
that piece of equipment. It won't happen
fast, but it bears watching. Or does it? The somewhat regrettable message
from the world of real war, Fourth
Generation war, is that deep-water battles
or prospective battles between navies means
little if anything. Speculating about the
balance between U.S. Navy aircraft carriers
and Chinese submarines is like wondering
what would happen at Trafalgar if
Villeneuve's van had responded immediately
to his signal to wear and support the center
of the Allies' line, or Admiral Gravina had
led his Squadron of Observation straight for
Collingwood's column. It's fun to think
about – personally, I enjoy it immensely –
but c'est ne pas la guerre. Control of
coastal and inland waters may play highly
important roles in Fourth Generation war,
but deep water naval battles like the
Glorious First of June, if they occur, will
be jousting contests, with broomsticks. In
real war, the U.S. Coast Guard may be more
useful than the U.S. Navy. That is the real lesson of the Chinese sub
incident: The U.S. Navy, like the U.S. Air
Force, without a torpedo fired or a single
dogfight, is on its way to Davy Jones's
Locker through sheer intellectual inanition.
Preparing endlessly for another carrier war
in the Pacific against the Imperial Japanese
Navy, it has become a historical artifact. In the late 19th century, the Chinese
people, outraged by repeated foreign
humiliations of China, took up a sizeable
collection of money to build China a modern
navy. The Dowager Empress used the funds to
build a marble pleasure boat for herself in
the lake near her summer palace. The U.S.
Navy's carrier battle groups are the marble
pleasure boats of the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees of the U.S. Congress. William S. Lind, expressing his own personal
opinion, is Director for the Center for
Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress
Foundation. To interview Mr. Lind, please contact: Mr. William S. Lind
Free Congress Foundation
717 Second St., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002 Direct line: 202-543-8796
nnn@freecongress.org The Free Congress Foundation is a 28-year-
old Washington, DC-based conservative
educational foundation (think tank) that
teaches people how to be effective in the
political process, advocates judicial
reform, promotes cultural conservatism, and
works against the government encroachment of
individual liberties. |
Anonymous
Nov 23
2006
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